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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 MOSCOW 000068

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SUBJECT: SECURITY DIALOGUE DISCUSSIONS, MOSCOW, RUSSIA,  
DECEMBER 15, 2008

REF: MOSCOW 3153

Classified By: Charge d/Affaires Eric Rubin, reasons 1.4(a), (b) and (d)  
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¶1. (C) Summary. Acting U/S Rood and DFM Ryabkov led U.S. and Russian delegation security discussions in Moscow December

¶15. The discussion focused heavily on the proposed U.S. missile defense (MD) deployment in eastern Europe and the Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) offered by the U.S., and a post-START Treaty, with little headway on either issue. Reiterating Russian insistence that the MD system not be deployed at all and that Iran was years away from becoming a threat, Moscow appeared to walk back from the Sochi Strategic Framework Declaration statement that if the TCBMs were agreed and implemented, it would be important and useful in assuaging Russian concerns over the deployment. Ryabkov argued the Russian countermeasures were not contrary to the Sochi Declaration, and claimed Secretary Gates said Russia's use of countermeasures was acceptable. Ryabkov said the only condition for Russia not to target Poland and the Czech Republic with missiles deployed in the Kaliningrad enclave was for the U.S. not to place the MD system in those two countries. While continuing to object to the insistence on reciprocity for U.S., Polish and Czech officials at Russian sites, Ryabkov said it might be possible for them to visit Russian Iskander sites, though when questioned, said he had been talking off the top of his head. (Note: both MFA North America Director Neverov and DVBR Deputy Director Koshelev told us December 16 this had taken them by surprise.

End Note) While emphasizing U.S. assurances regarding the MD system, Rood asked why we should try to reach agreement on the TCBMs if there would be no change in Russian behavior. On post-START, U/S Rood sought greater clarity on Russia's desired outcome for the Treaty. Ryabkov repeated Moscow's insistence that conventional offensive strategic weapons be covered under the treaty, both warheads and delivery vehicles be counted, and weapons be deployed only on national territory. He handed over a seven-page response (in Russian) to the U.S. draft treaty text, but in response to Rood's query how the START counting rules could be used to count both warheads and delivery vehicles at the reduced 1700-2200 number, Ryabkov indicated Russia did not want to use the exact START warhead attribution rules, but wanted to discuss warhead attribution, amongst other things, in expert meetings. Ryabkov did not support the desire by other non-U.S. START Parties, particularly Ukraine, to be parties to the new Treaty, and noted that Ukraine was beginning to hint that it might need to rethink its decision to give up its non-nuclear weapons status. The two sides also briefly touched on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Bratislava Initiative, the radioactive sources in Sukhumi, the Georgian highly-enriched uranium (HEU) sample currently in U.S. custody, and Russian membership in the

Australia Group. Delegation lists at paras 29 and 30. End summary.

¶2. (C) Missile defense and a post-START Treaty arrangement dominated discussions December 15 in Moscow between U.S. and Russian delegations led by Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and Security John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov. Both sides noted the importance of the U.S.-Russia relationship and the importance of the security dialogue channel. Commenting that this was the eleventh meeting on security issues he had conducted in this channel (though the first with Ryabkov), U/S Rood stressed the need to seek to reduce the differences between us, particularly on MD and post-START, and to make progress on a positive agenda, using the Sochi Declaration as a basis. Ryabkov concurred, emphasizing that failure to reach agreement on these two key issues would impede positive progress in the overall U.S.-Russia relationship. Stressing that Moscow would continue the discussions on both MD and post-START with the new Administration, Ryabkov asked whether Russia would need to start from scratch with the new team. Rood said he did not think so as most of Russia's positions were well known to members of the incoming Administration, and many U.S. delegation members would remain in place after the Administration changed.

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Missile Defense  
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Russia Still Opposed, Iran not an Imminent Threat

MOSCOW 00000068 002 OF 008

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¶3. (C) Ryabkov said that even though the differences between the U.S. and Russia on MD were still "obvious and considerable," and he did not anticipate being able to bridge them during the meeting, it was still useful to hold the dialogue so as to solidify the core problems and seek ways forward. Russia still objected strongly to the U.S. proposal to deploy an MD system in eastern Europe, and the latest U.S. paper on TCBMs did not remove Russia's major concerns. The sites in Poland and the Czech Republic threatened Russia. U.S. leaders had talked about the further development of missile defense. Therefore, as the U.S. gained new operational capabilities over time, it would make additions to the MD architecture. Once these sites existed, they eventually could be modified to have offensive capability. The Communiqué from the December 3-4 NATO Ministerial had shown that alliance support for the project had solidified and NATO members were moving into a phase in which they would be closer to an integrated, MD architecture in Europe.

¶4. (S) Ryabkov said Russia was concerned by the threat emanating from missile proliferation and wanted to work to counter that threat through various existing formats. He proposed to the U.S. a joint effort to evaluate the threat and discuss how to deal with it, based on data held by our respective agencies. But he questioned the usefulness of the MD deployment in eastern Europe, saying that while Russian intelligence agencies had similar information to the U.S. on Iranian missile development, the U.S. and Russian analyses of consequent Iranian capabilities and intentions were very different. Moscow did not believe that Iran's leaders intended to use its capabilities against countries in the region, and believed that Iran was years away from acquiring missiles with a range to threaten the U.S. He said that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, it would "mean dramatic changes in the international environment regarding Iran." Russia did not believe Iran would seek to destabilize the situation and create a risk such that countries that felt threatened by Iran would develop countermeasures against it. Russia was skeptical that the U.S. missile defense system would work effectively against an Iranian threat, thus, it was much more likely the system was aimed at Russia.

¶5. (S) U/S Rood said that all seven proposals for cooperation on an MD architecture remained on the table. He reiterated that the system was not aimed at Russia, and that if the threat from Iran disappeared, there would be no need to deploy the system. He agreed that we needed to share data on the Iranian threat, and stressed that the U.S. had already exchanged an unprecedented amount of intelligence on the Iranian threat with Russia. The U.S. had seen an increase in Iranian capabilities in recent months, including the flight test of a "Safir" space launch vehicle in August, and the launch of a two-stage solid propellant ballistic missile on November 12, which Iran claimed had a range of 2000 kilometers. Efforts to develop such longer-range missiles indicated to us the intent to reach longer-range targets. Iran already had the ability to reach Israel; we could only conclude from such efforts to develop longer-range missiles that Iran wanted to be able to reach Europe. Saying Iran had no intent to target the U.S. was not what we were seeing. Even if the Iranians were years away from achieving that goal, the ballistic missile defense system was also years away from being operational. Therefore, we needed to engage in prudent planning. In a previous meeting, General Venentsev had told us that Moscow might consider the threat differently if Iran demonstrated the ability to launch solid rocket, two-stage missiles. In response to U/S Rood's question, Ryabkov said Russia had monitored both flight tests, but it did not change Moscow's perception of the threat from Iran. Flight tests and attempts to put objects in orbit were different from what was needed for military purposes. Ryabkov reiterated arguments that Iran also was not able to get the necessary technologies because of international and unilateral sanctions, and had budget and personnel constraints preventing them from reaching a technically operative capability.

TCBMs Will Not Prevent Countermeasures

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¶6. (C) In what became the most heavily debated issue, Rood said the U.S. had understood from the Sochi Declaration that the TCBMs, if agreed and implemented, would be important and

MOSCOW 00000068 003 OF 008

useful in assuaging Russian concerns. The U.S. therefore expected that Russia would not need to follow through on its military-technical countermeasures such as to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad aimed at Poland and the Czech Republic if the two sides were able to agree on the TCBMs. Ryabkov responded that the two sides were not closer to a political agreement. The TCBMs proposed by the U.S. did not remove Russian concerns, and the problem was more fundamental than disagreement over the TCBMs. The number one issue for Russia was not transparency and confidence at the sites, but how to deal with the problem in a way that would bring Russia and the U.S. into alignment. In theory, the two sides could discuss many things, but in practice it was more difficult. The fundamental problem was that the construction of the site could not be offset by any of the TCBMs offered by the U.S. Russia wanted to start from scratch, with a joint discussion of the threat, followed by common development of an MD architecture and joint data exchange centers. Russia simply could not agree to the deployment of the system in the proposed region.

¶7. (C) In response to Rood's question, Ryabkov stressed that the only condition for Russia not deploying the Iskanders was non-deployment of the system in eastern Europe. U/S Rood pressed the point, saying our Ministers had deliberately chosen the term "assuage," not "eliminate," and it was the U.S.' understanding that if Russia's concerns were assuaged, this would mean Russia would no longer feel threatened, would no longer make threatening statements, and would no longer deploy the military-technical countermeasures. Ryabkov said Russia had agreed at Sochi that the TCBMs would not eliminate, but would somewhat assuage Russia's concerns. He

pointed out that the U.S. had removed elements previously proposed by Secretary Gates and added new requirements such as reciprocity. Even so, whatever TCBMs were agreed would not remove Russia's basic concern with the deployment.

18. (C) General Buzhinskiy, saying he was giving the "military justification," added that the ideal situation would be for the U.S. to cancel its plans for the "third site." Russia was not against the U.S. developing the potential to address threats from the Middle East, but the choice of location was wrong. At the proposed sites, the U.S. would not be able to intercept Iranian missiles, but would have the ability to intercept Russian missiles. Regarding U.S. assurances that the sites would not be significantly modified without consultation with Russia, Buzhinskiy said the U.S. had told Moscow three years previously it would not take a decision on the MD deployment without consulting Russia, and then had done just that, informing Russia that the deployment had been decided. While the TCBMs were good, they were not agreed, and some raised doubts. For example, a number of them required Polish or Czech agreement, but officials from those two countries had told Moscow the sites could be used against Russia. That was why President Medvedev had said Russia would need to deploy countermeasures. Russia would prefer more concrete obligations from the U.S.

19. (C) Rood said the Sochi Declaration was clear: "if the TCBMs were agreed, they would assuage." The U.S. did not conduct military responses if it believed its concerns were assuaged. If Iran stopped its effort to develop long-range missiles, the U.S. would not need to address such a threat. He said the U.S. viewed the Russian explanation as a major retreat from what was agreed at Sochi, and asked what the purpose of discussing the TCBMs was if Russia would not modify its behavior if they were adopted.

110. (C) Ryabkov responded that the focus of these discussions was correct; they gave both sides a better understanding of the other's position. Whatever different interpretations there may be of the Sochi Declaration, it was important to continue to try to agree on something that would assuage Russia's concerns. But, he noted, there was nothing in the Sochi Declaration that committed Russia to change its behavior. Ryabkov claimed Secretary Gates said Russia's use of countermeasures was acceptable. Moscow had not changed its position nor was it threatening anyone; the statement that Russia would deploy Iskanders if the MD system was constructed was a factual one. When asked how Russia defined "assuage its concerns," Ryabkov responded, "To us, assuage means our concerns are being addressed in a serious manner, but not removed."

Questions on TCBMs

MOSCOW 00000068 004 OF 008

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111. (C) Turning to specific questions, Ryabkov noted that the paper indicated that "major developments" at the site would be taken only after consultation with Russia, but what types of developments were considered "major," he asked. He stressed that there was no information on how the U.S. envisioned future development of the site, and no indication that the U.S. intended to limit the capabilities of the system in any way. Therefore, Russia had concluded that the U.S. could decide to install other elements of its global MD system, possibly including early-warning radars, anti-radar systems, and new land- or sea-based systems near Russia's borders. Furthermore, while it might be difficult to modify the site to allow offensive weapons now, there was no guarantee this would not be possible in the future. Ryabkov said he did not understand the TCBM that said the U.S. would not conduct long-range ground-based interceptor flight tests from Polish territory. If the U.S. was going to conduct such flight tests in California, what difference did it make? He also asked for clarification of the term "militarily useful

payload capacity," with respect to Iranian missile launches. He said that the TCBM document did not answer all of the questions Russia had asked in its non-paper, and Moscow might seek additional answers in the future.

¶12. (C) U/S Rood responded that the U.S. perceived "major developments" to be those that had a material bearing on or would change the character of the facility. A "minor development," which would not require consultation, would be something like regular operational maintenance, replacement of parts, a new covering on the radar, and certain software upgrades. However, software upgrades that changed the nature of the facility could be considered "major." Regarding future use of the sites, Rood said there was currently no intention to place more than 10 interceptors at the site in Poland. The U.S. could not convert the sites into facilities capable of fielding offensive weapons because the legal agreements with the two countries prohibited it. Furthermore, it would require enlarging the silos, and Russian liaison officers would quickly see what was happening. While he could not rule out that there could be changes to the system in the future if the global environment changed, Rood said the U.S. would continue discussions with Russia, and these TCBMs would enable Russia to assess the capabilities of the sites and to have assurances that the sites were not being significantly modified without Russian knowledge. Rood said the U.S. definition of "militarily significant payload" was one which would produce a "militarily significant effect" on the adversary. If Russia had a different definition, we would appreciate getting it. Rood repeatedly told Ryabkov he was prepared to answer any and all questions related to the TCBMs.

Reciprocity at Iskander Sites?

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¶13. (C) Ryabkov reiterated Russian comments that Moscow did not understand the concept of reciprocal visits to Russian MD sites, and it was causing a lot of political problems in Moscow. Russia did not have any sites targeted at other states, including Poland or the Czech Republic, so what purpose would be served by giving them access to the Russian sites? The U.S. proposal concerned reciprocal, not symmetrical, visits, Rood replied. In response to his comment that Russian statements that Moscow would need to place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad aimed at Poland and the Czech Republic could be seen as threatening the two countries, Ryabkov said if the two countries were concerned by these statements, perhaps Russia could let them visit Iskander sites. After Rood said that could be a way to resolve the issue over reciprocity, Ryabkov immediately backtracked, saying he had just been thinking aloud (note: both MFA North America Director Neverov and DVBR Deputy Director Koshelev told us separately the next day that they had been taken by surprise by Ryabkov's suggestion. It appears it had not been proposed or cleared by the interagency prior to the meeting. End note).

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Post-START  
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¶14. (C) Ryabkov said Russia's goal was to reach agreement on a new treaty to succeed START I before the end of 2009.

MOSCOW 00000068 005 OF 008

Moscow had thoroughly analyzed the U.S. draft text provided on October 24, 2008 (ref A). He handed over a seven-page non-paper in Russian with a summary of Moscow's response, which the U.S. could consider as "an authoritative reply" to the U.S. proposal (ref B). Ryabkov repeated Russia's argument that conventional offensive strategic weapons should be covered under the treaty, both warheads and delivery vehicles should be counted, and strategic weapons should be deployed only on national territory. In a response to a question from Rood on the relationship between warhead and

launcher numbers, Ryabkov said that Russia did not want to use the exact START attribution rules. However, launcher attribution was one of the issues that needed to be discussed by the experts in the future. Moscow wanted to take the most important elements of the START Treaty. It was necessary to count both warheads and delivery vehicles because it was impossible to identify whether a missile at the time of launch was armed with a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead. The concept of using the 2002 Moscow Treaty limits of 1700-2200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads did not give Russia a clear picture of how the U.S.' strategic potential would develop, and would not continue a decrease in warheads. The U.S. proposal did not correspond to the Sochi Declaration's commitment to have a treaty that would reinforce strategic stability.

¶15. (C) Ryabkov rejected the desire by the other members of START, particularly Ukraine, to be parties to the new treaty. He noted Ukraine was beginning to hint that it might need to rethink its decision to give up its nuclear status if it was excluded from the post-START treaty. Ukrainian officials had told Moscow they believed they had given up their status as the world's third largest nuclear power for nothing. Kazakhstan and Belarus were also raising questions, but were not as outspoken as Ukraine. He added that Moscow considered it important to take into account the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in 2010. If there were no new treaty, the context for the conference would be very different and it would be difficult to achieve meaningful results. U/S Rood shared Ryabkov's concern regarding Ukraine's comments at JCIC to walk back NPT commitments.

¶16. (C) DVBR Director Antonov complained that the U.S. text did not include any of the proposals put forward by Russia in 2007, except for one: that the treaty be legally-binding. If the U.S. was not willing to agree that all strategic offensive systems had to be deployed on national territory, Moscow could wake up one day and find U.S. offensive weapons in Georgia. Russia wanted to be certain the U.S. would not deploy such weapons close to Russia. Russia would be satisfied if the agreement simply said "there will be no deployment on foreign territory." Russia proposed that all strategic offensive weapons be deployed at START-declared facilities. Moscow was also concerned by U.S. use of heavy bombers. The U.S. had deployed such bombers at the start of the Iraq war, but had not informed Russia as required by the START Treaty. He also asked what definitions would be used and did the term "offensive weapons" mean the same in English as in Russian. Citing Washington's opposition to Russian membership in the Australia Group, Antonov argued that although Washington had said the U.S. and Russia were partners, Russia had not seen a partner's attitude in the way the U.S. approached issues with Russia. He also said that deterrence still existed. Therefore, we needed to take the best of START's verification measures into account.

¶17. (C) Rood emphasized that the U.S. needed a better understanding of Russia's desired outcome for a post-START agreement. We believed the U.S. and Russia were moving away from an adversarial relationship and the U.S. was seeking to reach an agreement that would not regulate hostility, the way START had, but would provide transparency, predictability and confidence. The U.S. saw the purpose of the new treaty as fundamentally different from START. The treaty text the U.S. had provided to Russia was a substantial step forward and would enable the two sides to carry out their commitment to reach the lowest possible levels of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security requirements and alliance obligations. It also provided significant insight into each other's capabilities through the transparency measures such as data exchanges, visits, inspections, telemetry and the like. The U.S. was trying to move away from reliance on nuclear weapons and to increase conventional capabilities, and Moscow should welcome this. But the U.S.

did not want to agree to a structure that would impede its ability to reduce or eliminate its nuclear forces. Focusing on a phantom number of warheads would not increase transparency. Rood agreed that the U.S. did not see a need for the other three countries to be part of the new treaty, noting that the circumstances that had led to them being part of START no longer existed. He said the U.S. would share Russia's concerns if Ukraine sought to reacquire nuclear weapons.

¶18. (C) In response to Antonov's complaint that the U.S. had not included Russian proposals, Rood countered that the U.S. had Russian elements such as a reduction in the number of strategic offensive weapons; aggregate numbers of strategic arms and the platforms attributed to them; data exchanges; launch notifications; visits; exhibitions; etc. The U.S. had not addressed deployments outside national territory because the purpose of this treaty was different. He added that the U.S. would not be able to place offensive weapons in Georgia without Russia knowing it because the data provisions would preclude it. Antonov declaimed, "I don't care about your plans; I care about your capabilities. Unless it's prohibited, you can deploy your weapons wherever you want, even if you tell Russia about them." He said while the U.S. was talking about TCBMs, Russia was talking about limitations.

¶19. (C) Rood asked how Russia expected to use START's counting rules to reach the goal of 1700-2200 nuclear warheads. He pointed out that the START Treaty had used attributed counting rules because it had been determined it was impossible to accurately verify the number of warheads. If Russia insisted on counting both warheads and delivery vehicles, the new treaty would be a completely different instrument from START. U.S. calculations had shown that Russia would need to make significant cuts in its delivery vehicles to meet the 1700-2200 figure. Was Russia prepared to do that? Clearly unprepared to respond to the question, Ryabkov said Russia operated on the assumption that it was possible to set limits for both warheads and delivery vehicles, but the limits on delivery systems and warheads would not be related by the exact START attribution rules. He said Russia did not want to inhibit U.S. development of conventional forces, but Russia's concerns needed to be addressed. There was currently a lack of trust between our countries, but fundamentally the U.S. and Russian positions were different. Moscow did not require that weapons kept in storage be counted, but since the U.S. was working on rearming strategic delivery vehicles with conventional arms, Russia wanted a regime that would assuage its concerns. He said that operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads did not take into account the warhead uploading problem. Moscow wanted experts from both sides to meet to review the START Treaty, article by article, and determine what was usable from the Treaty, including discussing verification provisions. (Note: in a meeting the following day, DVBR Deputy Director Koshelev said Russia's experts had said the verification provisions in the U.S. text appeared workable. End Note)

¶20. (C) DVBR Director Antonov stated the U.S. did not incorporate any Russian provisions outlined in the Russian Congruent Approaches paper into the draft treaty text. U/S Rood denied this and asked VCI SI Director Jerry Taylor to provide examples where many Russian considerations had been incorporated. Taylor explained that the data exchange provisions in the U.S. text were taken from the START Treaty and would be updated every six months through notifications sent via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. It would include the number, disaggregated by type, and if appropriate, category, of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, based at each location specified in the treaty.

¶21. (C) Rood said that it would be a challenge to negotiate and ratify a new treaty before the current treaty expired at the end of 2009. He described the process for appointing new political leadership; negotiating the new treaty; and obtaining the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. These

steps may take longer than twelve months. Both sides agreed that there would need to be intensive work undertaken to reach agreement before the START Treaty expired. If an agreement were not reached in time, Rood asked whether Russia would prefer to extend the START Treaty or to have no treaty in place. Ryabkov did not respond, saying just that Russia was considering the possibility there could be nothing to replace START when it expired. He said Russia was working on

MOSCOW 00000068 007 OF 008

their version of a post-START treaty and would provide it in mid-January 2009. Ryabkov said Russia did not want to simply extend the current START Treaty for a year or other short time period, but rather wanted to work on a new agreement.

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Other Issues: GICNT, Sukhumi, Georgian HEU, AG, AK-47's  
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¶122. (C) U/S Rood quickly highlighted several important remaining issues. These were the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Bratislava Initiative, the radioactive sources in Sukhumi, the Georgian highly-enriched uranium (HEU) sample currently in U.S. custody, and Russian membership in the Australia Group.

¶123. (C) In response to U/S Rood's comments, DFM Ryabkov stated that he agreed that the GICNT has gained momentum since its inception, but that we needed to look at how it could be made even better. He indicated that he was particularly interested in getting other member nations to do more. Ryabkov elaborated that "through table-top exercises and video-conferences, we can achieve much." Ryabkov said that, while Russia was a co-founder and co-chair of the GICNT, "other partners needed to assume such duties. Antonov asked whether it was not time for the U.S. and Russia to relinquish their co-chairmanship of the group, but Ryabkov quickly noted that the two sides could compare notes prior to the next event, an expert's meeting in the Netherlands in February 2009.

¶124. (C) On the sources in Sukhumi, Antonov said "we know about these sources and are working on it. We will provide an answer."

¶125. (S) Regarding the sample of HEU originally interdicted in Georgia, Ryabkov said that it was a technical issue whether a Russian plane came to the U.S. and picked it up or other means of transportation were used, and they would need to look into the issue further.

¶126. (C) Ryabkov pressed the U.S. to be more responsive to Russia's wish to join the Australia Group, emphasizing that Russian membership would be beneficial to everyone. He called for additional meetings at the expert level.

¶127. (C) In response to Ryabkov's concern about unlicensed production of AK-47's in the U.S., Rood said the U.S. had been unable to find any evidence of such production but would look into the matter if Moscow would provide specific information. Ryabkov said Moscow understood there was a joint U.S.-Bulgarian enterprise named Arsenal producing such weapons in Nevada, but they would pass on the specific information to the U.S.

Comment  
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¶128. (C) Russia is clearly hoping that the new Administration will alter the policy approach on both missile defense and post-START. Russia likely will re-evaluate its policies and strategies once it gains a better understanding of the new Administration's policy positions. Until then, we expect Russia to remain firm on its basic positions.

Delegation Lists

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¶29. (U) U.S. Delegation: Department of State: John Rood, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security; Anita Friedt, Director, EUR/PRA; James Timbie, Senior Advisor to the Acting Under Secretary (T); Tim Katsapis, Senior Advisor to the Acting Under Secretary (T); Jerry Taylor, Director, VCI/SI; William Shobert, Delegation Executive Secretary; Yuir Shkeyrov, interpreter. National Security Council: Michael Allen, Special Assistant and Senior Director Counterproliferation Strategy; Michael Hayes, Director for Security Cooperation and International Agreements. Department of Defense: Van Kinney, Missile Defense Policy Expert; Michael Yaguchi, START Treaty Policy Analyst; Lt. Col. Christopher Comeau, Joint Staff Plans; Paul Bigelman, Missile Defense Agency; Richard Trout, Regional expert. Embassy: Ambassador John Beyrle; Alice Wells, Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs; Cmdr Robert Kettle, Assistant Naval Attaché; Margaret Hawthorne, Chief, Political

MOSCOW 00000068 008 OF 008

External Unit; Michael Dunkley, EST Officer.

¶30. (U) Russian Delegation: Sergey Alekseyevich Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister; General Yevgeniy Petrovich Buzhinskyi, Chief, International Treaty Directorate, MOD; Igor Svyatoslavovich Neverov, Director, MFA North America Dept.; Anatoliy Ivanovich Antonov, Director, MFA Security and Disarmament Dept. (DVBR); Oleg Nikolayevich Burmistrov, Deputy Director, MFA North America Dept.; Sergey Mikhailovich Koshelev, Deputy Director, DVBR; Vladimir Ivanovich Yermakov, Section Chief, DVBR; Col. Yevgeniy Yuriyevich Il'in, Head of Bureau, International Treaty Directorate, MOD; Aleksandr Mikhailovich Trifonov, Senior Counselor, DVBR; Oleg Kovalenko, Senior Counselor, DVBR; Aleksey Yuriyevich Ivanov, First Secretary, MFA North America Dept.; Denis Nikolayevich Kolesnik, Attaché, MFA North America Dept.

¶31. (U) Acting U/S Rood cleared this cable.

RUBIN